Estonian rebellion against the West

Eesti mäss Lääne vastu.

The real backbone of Eastern European anti-liberalism is an attempt to break the constant feeling of inferiority and restore pride in self-determination, writes Tõnis Saarts in a comment originally published in Sirbis. "We no longer want to be like the West or the Nordic countries, where there are too many immigrants, where the indigenous Europeans are losing their national identities and liberal democracy is unable to cope with the excessive variety of societies and the dictates of the European Union ... We here in Estonia true and traditional Europeanism, which is disappearing elsewhere, and on this basis we should build a true Estonian nation state and a model of democracy that suits us, "says the arguments of those who think that the Western model of development is exhausting and that Estonia should choose the Hungarian and Polish path. The eternal tragedy of imitation In the last elections, one-fifth (if not one-third) of the voters supported the political forces cultivating this kind of thinking. Thus, such a new narrative is not an exercise by the minds of the individual extremists, but has a considerable influence on Estonian society today. Why? What is behind it? Could anti-Western sentiment become as prevalent in Estonia as elsewhere in Central and Eastern Europe? Some time ago, Bulgarian philosopher Ivan Krastev and British political scientist Stephen Holmes, who specializes in Eastern Europe, published a brilliant article in the journal Democracy1, analyzing in depth the origins of the anti-Western insurgency currently unfolding in Eastern Europe. For them, there is nothing inexplicable or surprising in the rise of Victor Orban and Jarosław Kaczyński (or our EKRE). Juhan Kivirähk: Coalition seems best suited to EKRE voters

  Unlike many other Eastern European populism scholars, they see the reasons not so much for the overly conservative values, social inequalities or pressures of globalization in Eastern Europe, but for the partial failure of the Western Imitation Project that began in 1989. The following paragraph is based largely on the statements of these authors, which I am trying to place (with my own additions) in the Estonian context. One of the most important conclusions Krastev and Holmes draw is that "the imitator always feels inferior and will look down on his subject of imitation." In addition, the imitator feels that he is gradually losing his distinctive identity. However, since he does not in any way become similar to his desired object of imitation, in the end he and others do not understand who he is or is not (like the West, but not really). Infinitely no individual or society can be in such a haze. At some point there must be a backlash or some sort of solution: either by saying a clear "no" to previous imitation attempts and moving in the opposite direction, or by attempting to restore self-pride by claiming that they have actually become even more "genuine" than the former idealized imitation. As I will explain later, both processes have actually taken place in Eastern Europe and Estonia. Thus, for Krastev and Holmes, social psychology offers a much more adequate explanation of what has happened in Eastern Europe than any statistical analysis that seeks out the roots of populism in a "backward" sense of value or under the pressures of globalization.

 

Sirbis: Viivi Luik and Tõnu Õ happalu flood of questions about each other In short, the real backbone of Eastern European anti-liberalism is much deeper: an attempt to break the constant sense of inferiority and restore the pride of self-being. Many Eastern Europeans were not ready for secularism, multiculturalism and gender equality because, unlike the West, this part of Europe did not experience the 1968 left-liberal revolution. Wikimedia Commons Estonians also felt in the 1990s and 2000s that moving to the West was the only way to achieve economic prosperity, freedom and democracy. It was believed that if we make enough efforts, the West will embrace us, the Nordic countries will look at us as one of our own. Three decades have passed and we are still a third of the standard of living in Western Europe, for Western Europeans we are still "retarded Eastern Europeans" (let's put it aside - they think so) and Estonian democracy still seems to many people as a distant elite project. to offer non-partisans "any real opportunity to participate. No wonder when the part of the population who feel that they have not won the Westernization in the fast-track says they are now helping this imitation of the West, we are now trying our Estonian way. While the Center Party, led by Savisaar, used to speak to thinkers like this, now the EKRE does. Helmed has done something unimaginable in Estonian politics - they have successfully uncoupled nationalism from the Westernist symbiosis since Mart Laar's first government in the early 1990s.

  Toomas Sildam: government budgeting is tough for government (2) This has allowed them to bring together previously completely antagonistic groups such as ex-clay islands and anti-Russian rabies under one roof, thus increasing their party support far beyond what had been anticipated. Meaning of the changing "West" Why are many Eastern Europeans still turning to the Western liberal model? Is it really just a disappointment that, decades after joining the European Union, the West has not caught up with the standard of living, and those who come from the East are still not considered fully-fledged Europeans? For Krastev and Holmes, this is just one part of a much wider set of causes. One of the important reasons is that Eastern Europeans are simply confused because what is West and Western / European has constantly changed over time. Whereas in the 1990s it was necessary to build a functioning market economy and democratic institutions in order to reach the West, in the 2000s it became clear that the path to the West was to follow the pre-accession instructions given by Brussels very closely. "But it turned out in the 2010s that we can become Western only if we are tolerant, secular, multicultural, promoting gender equality, legalizing same-sex marriage, etc." Later, however, in 2010, it turned out that Westerners can only become western if they are tolerant, secular, multicultural, promoting gender equality, legalizing same-sex marriage, and so on. For the latter, however, many Eastern Europeans were not ready because, unlike the West, this part of Europe did not experience the 1968 left-liberal revolution. Even in the West, it took a couple of decades to establish such values ​​of tolerance for openness and the wretchedness of society, so it was too much to expect that in the East all this would take place in less than a decade. When something that is already objectively overwhelmed by the imitator and the object of imitation constantly changes its color, shape and character over time, then at some point the imitator is so confused that he finally says, "Enough!". Lauri Tõnspoeg: We should cooperate with those who do not like us So in Estonia. Many who, in the 1990s and beyond, were prepared to undergo major changes to transform Estonia into a normal Western democracy and a functioning market economy, did not understand why now suddenly Europeanism must mean opening up borders to immigration, forced tolerance for all kinds of minorities and multiculturalism the home Russians were not fully integrated, etc. They felt that what was required of the West was a threat to what was Estonian and characteristic. And then the men in the hoods came and said that we didn't have to do all of this, to submit to it - of course, a large part of society applauded it. Why imitate a dying dinosaur? As another important reason, Krastev and Holmes point to a decline in the West's own attraction. The success of China over the past decades has shown that economic prosperity can be achieved without liberal democracy. The past economic crisis (2008-2011) severely eroded the viability and credibility of the neo-liberal economic model, but it was this model on which Estonia and other Eastern European countries built their transition model. In the East, the notion that, if liberalism did not work in the economy, why it should work in society, in values ​​and in democracy, began to spread. Becoming President of the United States in Donald Trump has created a dangerous illusion in Estonia and elsewhere in Eastern Europe that it is still possible to be part of Western security architecture, while not following Western liberal values. ERR jury: Kaja Kallas wins policy debate at "First Studio" (24) For some Estonian politicians, Trump-style right-wing authoritarian nationalism seems to be the future and the liberal model hitherto cultivated in old Europe is yesterday. So, why imitate the old dinosaur when new sizes are on the rise? In fact, migration has been a problem for Eastern Europe rather than Western Europe, but more in the form of emigration than immigration. For Krastev and Holmes, anti-immigration attitudes in Eastern Europe reflect not so much intrinsic racism and xenophobia, but even the fear, to a certain extent, that demographic aging and the exodus of local youth to the West, along with growing immigration pressures, will lead to demographically unpredictable consequences. "Fear of refugees reflects a sense of the danger of their own people disappearing and shrinking, their fear of losing their identity and their originality." Thus, some of the refugees who have fled to Eastern Europe and Estonia have become, for people, a symbol of all that has gone wrong in the open, liberal, and globalized world since 1989 (or 1991). a sense of diminishing danger, a fear of losing one's identity and originality. Henn Põlluaas: Estonia still has much room for improvement in terms of political culture (6) In the context of the refugee crisis, Western Europeans were particularly keen on their arrogance and their tendency to once again teach Eastern Europeans what the right and European values ​​are - this time it was already causing a frenzy. In addition, there is concern that new immigrants are taking away from the poorer Eastern Europeans the last job and bread they have left. The White Reserve's Last Reserve In the light of the above, a new narrative is being born in Eastern Europe and Estonia, which briefly states: "Here in the East, we are a true Europe. A Europe full of traditional and old values. A Europe still free from foreign cultural influences brought by immigrants a non-liberal model of democracy can prevent the decline of civilization and the West from imminent social chaos. " To paraphrase the chairman of an Estonian national conservative party, Estonia could become the last reserve of a white European lifestyle in the future. Such a new narrative allows Eastern Europeans to do two things: first, it allows us to restore our self-esteem and distinctive identity (we are part of Europe, but we are even more genuine Europeans than those there in the West); secondly, the National Conservatives hope that it will help to build the right "national home", where young people no longer want to leave "troubled" Western Europe and former migrants want to return. Although in the Visegrád countries (Poland, Hungary, etc.) the Western-critical and anti-liberal narrative described above seems to be gaining dominance, in Estonia we are unlikely to see comparable developments in the near future. Why not? Kaja Kallas: If the government has no red lines, Estonia has (5) First, geopolitics and the Russian factor play an important role: while Central European countries can afford to selectively embrace Western liberal values ​​and defy the European Union, the Baltic States simply do not have this luxury because of their geopolitical position. Western and Eurosceptic forces in Estonia still need to work very hard to persuade the majority of the electorate to believe that a "gray zone" between West and East will be as well protected as the present-day Estonia integrated with the Western space of values ​​and security. Secondly, unlike many Eastern European countries, Estonia seems to be much more optimistic about the future: the economy is developing, emigration has stopped, corruption is under control, the state is functioning. The sense of perspective and stagnation is certainly not prevalent in our society today. Thirdly, due to Estonia's small size, position and history, there has always been quite a bit of talk about the "peculiar Estonian route between East and West" - quite a different mindset from Hungarians and Poles, accustomed to being central powers in Europe. However, this does not mean that the anti-Western insurgency in Estonia does not have any significant social support base. However, it is unlikely that Western-critical forces in Estonian politics will become toned down in the next decade. The latter, however, does not mean that we do not try to understand the people who think today at the same wavelength as Fidesz and PiS supporters in Hungary and Poland. 1 Ivan Krastev, Stephen Holmes, Imitation and Its Discontents. Journal of Democracy 2018, 29 (3), pp. 117-128. 2 See also Jan Zielonka, Counter-revolution: Liberal Europe in Retreat. Oxford University Press, Oxford 2019. Editor: Kaupo Meiel.